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A NEW APPROACH TO THE LEGALITY
OF FRANCHISING TIE-INS
The tying doctrine of antitrust law has been the subject of
frequent spirited criticism by scholars of diverse disciplines. Econ-
omists and economics-oriented legal scholars in particular have
treated tying doctrine with notorious disapproval.' They have
challenged the fundamental assumptions of the tying doctrine,
labelling them "indefensible," 2 "false," 3 and "arbitrary." 4 Other
legal scholars, although quick to criticize judicial formulations of
the doctrine, have attempted to defend the doctrine on the ground
that it serves to advance such traditional antitrust values as free
access to markets and consumer sovereignty.5 Caught in this cross-
fire are the courts which, though cognizant of the basic soundness of
the economic analysis, shy away from abandoning the convenient
per se prohibition against tying, in order to avoid what Justice
1 See B. Bong, Tim ANTRUST P,nA.ox 365-81 (1978); R. PosNs, AwnT-
TRusT LAw 171-84 (1976); G. HALE & B. HALE, MAmET Powxn: S=zE AND SHAPE
uNnrD THE SHm AN AcT 53 (1958); Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in
Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and Irrelevant, 65 CALIF. L. 1,Ev. 1143 (1977); Baker,
The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L.
REv. 1235 (1980); Baldwin & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and
Economics, 8 ANruST BulL. 743 (1963); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line
Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960); Director & Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. 1tEv. 281 (1956); Edwards, Economics of "Tying"
Arrangements: Some Proposed Guidelines for Bank Holding Company Regulation,
6 A irrmausT L. & EcoN. 1Ev. 87 (No. 3, 1973); Ferguson, Tying Arrangements
& Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 L. & CoNTEM . PRoB. 552 (1965);
Hilton, Tying Sales and Full-Line Forcing, 81 WELTwRTScHAzTICHES Au"cmv 265
(1958); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory (pts. 1 & 2),
76 YA. L.J. 1397 (1967), 80 YALE LJ. 195 (1970); Markovits, Tie-ins and
Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 TEx. L. RBv. 1363 (1980);
Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 626 (1965);
Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT.
REv. 152. Burstein, supra, and Ferguson, supra, soundly criticize tying doctrine
but would retain a per se rule. See note 106 infra & accompanying text.
2 Baker, supra note 1, at 1317.
3 Bowman, supra note 1, at 20.
4Id. 33.
5See C. KAYsEN & D. Tunmm, ANrUST Porcy 157 (1959); L. SurLavr,
HANDBOOr OF E LAW OF ANRrusT 431-72 (1977); Bauer, A Simplified Ap-
proach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAim. L. REv.
283 (1980); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958); Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-in Doctrine
-after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L.J. 86 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Logic of
.Foreclosure].
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Marshall might call a "ramble through the wilds of economic
theory." 6
This Comment represents another attack on the tying doctrine.
Unlike previous commentaries, however, this Comment perceives in
the field of trademark franchising a remarkable confluence of other-
wise divergent values. Both economic efficiency and the traditional
social goals of antitrust can be served by permitting tying in trade-
mark franchising, except where the effect of tying would be to raise
a barrier to future entry into the market.
The primary purpose of this Comment is to develop an
analytical framework and legal test that facilitates judicial use of
economic analysis in franchise tying cases. This Comment offers a
test that is no less, and perhaps more, certain and manageable than
the present per se rule. Use of this test would let society reap the
full benefits of trademark franchising without imposing any signif-
icant additional burden on the courts.
In part I, this Comment briefly outlines the tying doctrine in
general and as applied to franchise tying. Part II discusses the
nature and effects of trademark franchising. Part III synthesizes
the economic analysis of tying with the principles of trademark
franchising. Part IV assesses use of the present per se rule in the
franchise tying context. Finally, part V presents and discusses a
general rule of legality for tying in trademark franchising.
I. BASIC TYING DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS
A tying arrangement is characterized by a seller's refusal to sell
a product except on the condition that the buyer also purchase a
different product.7 The first product is referred to as the tying
product, the second as the tied product.
6 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.10 (1972). In Moore
v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1977), the court stated:
The clear implication from a purely economic standpoint is that tie-ins
should be considered on a case-by-case basis because they are not in-
herently detrimental. They can in fact be beneficial.
The difficulty with adopting such an approach is well-recognized and
it derives from the nature of courts and the costs of judicial enforcement.
The problem stems from the unwillingness, if not the inability, of courts
to undertake complex economic decision making in the face of economic
indeterminancy and over-crowded court calendars.
7 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). A tying
arrangement may also be created from an agreement that the buyer not purchase
what would be the tied product from anyone but the seller of the tying good. Id.
This Comment is not concerned with such arrangements.
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The Supreme Court has treated tying arrangements as per se
illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Acts 8 because, in the Court's
view, these arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition." 9 The hostility of the courts to tying
is based on three concerns. First, tying may enable a seller to
extend his market power over the tying product into the market for
the tied product.10 Such use of a tie-in to extend market power is
frequently referred to as "leverage." ". Second, tying doctrine is
intended to protect buyers against "the coerced sacrifice of alterna-
tives" to the tied product.'2 Third, courts have expressed a belief
that tying limits access of competing suppliers to the tied product
market.'3 These last two concerns taken together evince a desire
by the courts that competition in the sale of each product be "on
the merits." 14
Characterization of the tying doctrine's legal application as a
"per se" prohibition is somewhat misleading because a plaintiff
must do more than merely show the existence of a tying arrangement
in order to prevail.' The Supreme Court has stated that an illegal
tie-in will be held to exist whenever it is shown that (1) the tying
sTying arrangements have been found to violate section one of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which provides in relevant part: 'Every contract, com-
bination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . , is hereby declared to be illegal."
Tying arrangements have also been found to violate section three of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), which explicitly prohibits certain types of
tying arrangements and applies a different legal standard than section one of the
Sherman Act. Section three, however, is limited to cases in which the tying good
is "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities." Id.
Since this Comment is concerned with tie-ins in trademark franchising, in which
case the tying product is a trademark, the discussion does not involve the Clayton
Act.
ONorthern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting
Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
10 Id. 6.
11 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 1, at 20.
12 Turner, supra note 5, at 60. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S.
38, 44-46 (1962); Northern Pae. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
13See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1962); Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Some commentators believe
that free access is the central concern behind the tying doctrine. See Turner,
supra note 5, at 60-62; Logic of Foreclosure, supra note 5.
14 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 10-12 (1958)
(quoting Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953)).
See Baker, supra note 1, at 1268; Turner, supra note 5, at 60.
15 The inconsistency of the Court's "per se" rule with the strict definition of
"per se" has caused confusion among both laymen and lawyers. For two attempts
to dispel this confusion see Baldwin & McFarland, Some Observations on 'Per Se'
and Tying Arrangements, 6 ANrrmusT BULL. 433 (1961); Singer, Market Power
and Tying Arrangements, 8 AN=rrrUST BuLL. 653 (1963).
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and tied products are separate and distinct; Il (2) the seller has
"sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to
appreciably restrain competition in the market for the tied
product," '1 and (3) "a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate com-
merce is affected." Is Some lower federal courts also require the
plaintiff to show that he was coerced by the seller into buying the
tied product.19
In addition to requiring proof of these elements, the "per se"
rule is also subject to certain defenses. These defenses consist of
business or economic justifications for the illegal tying arrangement.
One such justification is the new industry defense, which saves a
tie-in if it is shown to be necessary to protect the industry dur-
ing the early stages of its development.20  Another justification-
and one that is particularly applicable to franchising tie-ins-is the
goodwill or quality control defense. Under this defense, a tie-in
will be permitted if it is necessary to protect the goodwill associated
with a tying good and no alternative quality-control arrangement,
such as specifying the characteristics of the products to be used in
conjunction with the tying, good is practicable.21 For example, a
franchisor may require that a franchisee purchase certain products
from him as a condition of the franchise agreement if the use of an
inferior product would damage the goodwill of the franchisor's
trademark and if the tied product is too complex to be suitable for
16 See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 507 (1969).
17 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
18Id. 6 (citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
This requirement may be meaningless. Courts have focused on dollar amounts
rather than market percentages in assessing the significance of the amount of
commerce affected by the tie-in. Tying arrangements involving as little as
$40,000 and $50,000 worth of sales in the tied product have been determined to
be "not insubstantial." Levy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Two
Product Rule for Tying Arrangements, 69 TRaPAma REP. 41, 57 (1979). The
Supreme Court has found tied sales of as little as $60,800 "not insubstantial."
See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962).
19See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 723 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d
434, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661-63 (2d
Cir. 1974). But see 9 CoNtr. L. Ray. 164, 170 (1976) (arguing that "[tihe
presence or absence of coercive sales tactics is not related to the economic evils
that tying law seeks to curb."). See generally Austin, supra note 1.
20 See United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
21See, e.g., Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-47 (5th Cir.
1976). The court suggested that the "new industry" and "quality control" defenses
are "indistinguishable" in that both are without force if a competitor can supply
the tied items in the same quality class as those supplied by the seller. id. 47.
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a specifications list.P Unfortunately for franchisors, the scope of
this defense has been minimized by the courts.
23
The tying doctrine has generally been applied to franchising
in cases in which the franchisor's licensing of his trademark or name
was conditioned on agreement by the prospective franchisee to pur-
chase additional products from him.24 In these cases, the courts
have differed greatly in their treatment of the elements of the tying
offense. Some courts have held that the trademark constitutes a
distinct tying product separate from the tied goods; other courts
have viewed the trademark and tied product as a single package and
thus declined to find any tying arrangement.25 Whereas several
courts have inferred the requisite economic power in the tying
product from the trademark or name,2 6 other courts have required
a more detailed inquiry into the franchisor's market power.
27
Courts which have required proof of individual coercion of fran-
chisees have done so under what frequently seem to be differing, if
not conflicting, standards of proof.28 As is true of tie-in cases gen-
erally, however, the substantiality of the amount of commerce
affected has rarely, if ever, been an important issue.23
II. THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING
A. The Nature of Franchising
The distinguishing characteristic of trademark franchising is a
license from the owner of a trademark or a trade name to the
22 See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 955 (1972).
23 E. KnTrmm, 2 FEmEA.L ANTrnv LAW § 10.62, at 258 (1980).
24 See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 724-25 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Northern v. McGraw Edison Co.,
542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Carpa, Inc.
v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
25 See, e.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980);
Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (8th Cir.
1972); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, [1974-2] Trade Cas. 775,429
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
2 0 See, e.g., Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463
F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See also In re Chock Full 0' Nuts,
83 F.T.C. 573 (1973).
27 See note 194 infra.
28Compare, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) and Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc.,
531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) with Capital Tem-
poraries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661-63 (2d Cir. 1974) and Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See also notes
186-89 infra & accompanying text.
29 See Harkins, Tying and the Franchisee, 47 Ain=Usr L.J. 903, 905 (1979).
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franchisee permitting the licensee to sell, distribute, or manufacture
products or services under the trademark (or trade name).30 Use
of the trademark permits the franchisee to benefit from the con-
sumer goodwill associated with it.
In order to ensure that the new franchisee does not damage
this accumulated goodwill, the franchisor will usually require the
franchisee to maintain certain quality standards, and will monitor
the franchisee's performance of the agreement.31 In turn, the fran-
chisor often provides the franchisee with certain services such as
advertising and technical training.32 The franchisee's position thus
falls somewhere between independent businessman and employee:
the franchisee sacrifices some degree of control over the conduct of
his business in order to obtain the benefit of the goodwill associated
with the trademark and whatever other services the franchisor
agrees to provide.
B. The Economic Basis of Franchising
Franchising has undergone rapid and consistent growth since
the end of World War 11.33 In 1969, franchised outlets had retail
sales of 90 billion dollars, which represented more than twenty per-
cent of all United States retail sales.3 4  By 1972, annual sales had
increased to 134 billion dollars, representing twenty-five percent of
all retail sales3 5 In 1980, franchised retail outlets had sales of 295
billion dollars, thirty-one percent of all retail sales.38
The rapidness of this growth stems from franchising's useful-
ness as a means for a producer to gain some significant measure
of control over the distribution of his product and yet retain some
80 See generally G. CricmKm, 15 BusINss ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01 (1980).
Professor Sullivan distinguishes several different types of franchising arrange-
ments, only one of which permits the franchisee to operate under the franchisor's
trademark. L. SurLwvAN, supra note 5, at 399-401. This type of franchising he
refers to as "a franchise in the strictest sense." Id. 401. The term "franchising,"
as used in this Comment, refers to precisely this type of arrangement. This defini-
tion of franchising is in accord with that used by scholars who have studied fran-
chising. See U. OzAN & S. HuNT, SENATE SELEcT CommarrTE ON SMAlr
BusniEss, 92D CoNG., 1ST SESS., THE EcoNoMIc EFFECTS OF FRANCnSING 26
(Comm. Print 1971); L. Rubin, A Theory of Franchising (1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Pennsylvania's Van Pelt Library).
3 1 See G. Giacm mAr, supra note 30.
32 Id.
3L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 2.
3 4 Note, Regulation of Franchising, 59 MmN. L. REv. 1027, 1028 n.9 (1975).
35 Id.
3 6 BuiuAu OF INDUsTR AL EcoNoMIcs, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMEmcRE, FnANcISING
n Tm ECONOMY 1979-1981, at 1-10 (1981).
[Vol. 129:1267
FRANCHISING TIE-INS
of the advantages of selling his product through a system of inde-
pendent retailers.3 7 Franchising thus represents a step away from a
system of market transactions among producers, wholesalers, and
retailers, and a step towards full vertical integration.
A complete discussion of the economics of vertical integration
into distribution is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is suffi-
cient for our purposes to note that several reasons have been sug-
gested. Whereas some authors have explained the phenomenon in
terms of technological economies,38 and others have noted the im-
portance of managerial economies and economies in advertising,38
Professor Oliver Williamson has emphasized a third factor: vertical
integration is a means of avoiding the transaction costs of contract-
ing between independent firms by conducting such transactions
within a single firm.40 Transaction cost savings can be attained
independently of technological and managerial economies and may
explain cases of vertical integration where these economies do not
exist.41
The transaction cost model helps explain franchising's appeal
for many producers. Franchising is most likely to occur when the
supplier's product is the subject of extensive consumer comparison
shopping and when the consumer's confidence in the retailer and
the retailer's supply of various services are important factors in the
decision to buy.42 In such circumstances, the producer will nor-
mally seek some control over the retailing of his product in order
to build up and maintain customer loyalty.43 He could seek to
accomplish this end by contracting with independent retailers and
subjecting them to various vertical restrictions,44 but franchising
or full vertical integration will often be a less costly means of
37 See L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 1, 85.
38J. BA n, INDUSTRL4 OnG pNzAT7oN 380-81 (1968); F. ScHmm , INDUsTriAL
MInAsr Smucuun AND ECONOMIC PEFmOMANCE 78 (2d ed. 1980); L. Rubin,
supra note 30, at 29-31.
39 See L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 31-33.
40 See, e.g., Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Con-
siderations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1450-63 (1974); Williamson, The Vertical
Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 Am. EcoN. REv. 112
(1971). The importance of transaction cost considerations in explaining vertical
integration is also emphasized in L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 36-40.
41 See Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considera-
tions, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1444-47, 1450, 1454-56 (1974).
42E. LEwis & B. HANCOCK, Tim FaANcmsE SYsE or DS=BUTI N 7
(1963).
43 The desire of some producers to control presentation of the product at the
retail level in order to maintain or expand demand is noted in L. Rubin, supra
note 30, at 43.
44 See generally B. POSNEB, supra note 1, at 147-51.
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organizing distribution due to the problems inherent in dealing
with an independent retailer.45
Once the decision is made to integrate forward into distribu-
tion, the entrepreneur must decide whether he will control the
retail or wholesale facilities himself or franchise them to others.
Most choose to franchise. In 1973, franchising represented about
thirty percent of total retail trade, whereas manufacturers' sales
through wholly owned stores represented only about two percent
of such trade.46
Two reasons help account for the dominance of franchising.
First, franchising may enable a franchisor to obtain the use of the
franchisees' available capital.47 This may be an attraction to an
entrepreneur who is unable to raise the capital for a new venture
either internally or at an attractive interest rate in the capital
market. An entrepreneur may lack a sufficiently established repu-
tation on which potential lenders can base their confidence, and
may thus be unable to borrow capital funds except at very high
interest rates. 48 In such circumstances, franchising may be an
attractive way to raise capital.
This capital-raising potentiality of franchising may also appeal
to entrepreneurs who wish to shift some of the risk of establishing
new outlets to franchisees.49 To the extent that a franchisee in-
vests his own funds in the new outlet, he bears the risk of the
enterprise. Thus, the franchisor, by requiring franchisees to invest
some capital, enables himself to expand into areas where the de-
mand for his product is uncertain at less risk to himself.50
45 See Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifica-
tions of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 969-72 (1979).
46 L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 1.
47This is a frequently mentioned explanation of the growth in franchising.
See, e.g., E. Lmwis & R. HANCOCr, supra note 42, at 14-15; U. OzAN,. & S. HuNT,
supra note 30, at 80-81; L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 56-57. But see Rubin, The
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN.
223, 225-26 (1978).
4SWilliamson has suggested that lenders may be cautious in lending funds to
an inexperienced entrant into a new field due to lack of knowledge concerning the
new entrants qualifications and fears that the new entrant will misrepresent his
chances of success. See Williamson, supra note 41, at 1457-78. The same con-
cerns might influence lenders who are faced with a firm that has enjoyed limited
success in one or several geographic markets and seeks to greatly enlarge the scope
of its operations. Banks may in general charge higher rates to those who lack
established reputations.
49 Of course, if the franchisor contributes the major portion of the initial
investment, as is often the case, this explanation of franchising becomes less
important
60 The price the franchisor pays for this reduction in risk is the difference
between the expected return to his capital if invested in the new outlet and its
expected return in the best alternative investment.
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Second, franchising is a system for organizing production which
combines the incentives of a small proprietorship with the scale
economies of a large firm.51 As the number of a firm's retail
outlets or distributorships grows, centralized management becomes
more and more difficult. The firm thus has an incentive to grant
increased authority to its local managers5 As such authority is
delegated, however, the firm is faced with a second problem-pro-
viding local managers with an incentive to manage their operations
in the most efficient manner. In most cases, the best solution to
this problem is to manage distribution through a franchisee rather
than through one of the firm's own managers, 3 because a salaried
manager's incentive to operate the outlet efficiently is less than
that of a franchisee, whose earnings depend directly upon the
success of the outlet. This arrangement also benefits the fran-
chisee by enabling him to profit from the franchisor's management
expertise and its economies of scale in advertising, research and
development, and purchasing."4 For example, a new franchisee
may learn to manage his enterprise competently at less cost through
lessons from the franchisor than through trial and error.
Capital raising seems to be an important motivation for the
use of franchise systems of distribution, at least during the parent
firm's early stages of growth.5 5 This explanation, however, can-
not fully explain the growth in franchising. McDonald's Corpora-
don, for example, appears to be primarily concerned with obtaining
franchisees who will be good managers5 6 not with raising capital or
51 See McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with
Tie-ins, 58 CAIF. L. BEv. 1085, 1087 (1970). See also E. Luwis & R. HaNcoc,
supra note 42, at 14-15; U. OzA'mE & S. HuNT, supra note 30, at 80-81; L. Rubin,
supra note 30, at 47-56 (evaluating this explanation from the vantage point of the
theory of bureaucracy).
62 Management decentralization may enable firms to offset management dis-
economies resulting from large firm size and thus enable them to exploit any
available economies of scale in other fields. See F. Scrua, supra note 38, at
85-88. Such management diseconomies may be explained by the information dis-
tortion resulting from a large number of hierarchical levels within one organization.
See Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. PoL. EcoN.
123, 126 (1967).
53Cf. text accompanying note 46 supra (comparing franchises with wholly-
owned stores).
54 Cf. L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 30-33 (discussing the importance of econ-
omies of scale of various types in franchising systems).
55 U. OzANNE & S. HuNT, supra note 30, at 82, report that many fast food
franchisors would prefer to own all the stores themselves but are unable to do
this because of lack of capital. The source of this evidence was an opinion survey
of fast food franchisors. The authors also note that capital problems may decrease
over time. Id. 81.
56Principe v. McDonald's Corporation, 631 F.2d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 1980).
McDonald's selects and purchases the site and constructs the building for each new
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sharing risk. Apparently, as the franchisor grows, the need to
obtain risk capital diminishes and the desire to obtain highly
motivated management increases.6 7
C. The Social Benefits of Franchising
The foregoing discussion permits an estimation of the social
benefits attributable to franchising. First, economic efficiency 58
is promoted. To the extent that franchising reduces the manage-
ment problems of vertical expansion, the total resource cost of pro-
viding a good or service to consumers is reduced. As this Comment
has previously suggested, many goods and services cannot be effec-
tively marketed unless the producer has a sufficient degree of con-
trol at the retail level to ensure uniformity in the marketing of
the product."" Franchising will often be the most efficient way to
achieve this control because it allows the enterprise to take ad-
vantage of existing scale economies and at the same time provides
efficiency-promoting incentives for the local managers. 0 In addi-
tion, consumers benefit because the increased availability of stores
of standardized quality bearing a common trademark reduces the
cost of identifying a store with products of acceptable quality."' As
a result of these cost savings, resources are freed to be used else-
where in the economy and efficiency is thus promoted. Efficiency
is also promoted if franchising reduces the risk and capital prob-
lems associated with vertical expansion, because these problems
interfere with the flow of resources to their most valuable uses.62
In addition to its efficiency-enhancing properties, franchising
produces social benefits consonant with the traditional antitrust
outlet. Id. 305-06. The company then selects franchisees "primarily on the basis
of their willingness to work for the success of their operations." Id. 310.
57 See note 55 supra. The Dunkin' Donuts chain employs a similar system.
See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
58 As used in this Comment, efficiency means the use of economic resources
in a manner that maximizes human satisfaction as measured by willingness to pay
for goods and services. See generally R. PosNER, EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW
10-11 (2d ed. 1977).
59 See notes 42 & 43 supra & accompanying text
60 See notes 51 & 52 supra & accompanying text.
61 See F. ScusEER, supra note 38, at 378.
62 See generally Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Perti-
nent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in 1 SuBcom2vsrrE
O<s EcONOMY Im GOVERNMENT, JoINT ECONO1MC COMMITIEE, 91ST CONG., 1sT
Srss., Tim ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUnLIc EXPENmTtrRE: THE PPB SYSTEM
47, 54-56 (Comm. Print 1969). Cf. R. PosNERt, supra note 58, at 9-10 (referring
to "the tendency of resources to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if
voluntary exchange-a market-is permitted.").
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goals of preserving business opportunities for small entrepreneurs
and decreasing concentration of economic power and centralization
of economic decisionmaking. 3 Franchising has been described as
"the last frontier for the small businessman." 64 One study has
estimated that between thirty-six and sixty-eight percent of all
franchisees would not be independent businessmen if franchising
opportunities were not available.65 In addition, franchising, be-
cause it allows exploitation, of any scale, transaction-cost, or distribu-
tion economies, provides an alternative to full vertical integration.,6
Several courts 67 and commentators 68 have noted this choice of
alternatives and the possibility that, by making franchising more
difficult and costly, society runs the risk of encouraging vertical
integration.
III. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF FRANCHISE TIE-INS
A. Why Franchisors Use Tie-Ins: The Metering Theory
The preceding discussion has suggested that the franchising
industry promotes important economic and social goals. This
Comment now turns to considering whether the primary effect of
per se illegality of franchise tying arrangements is to prevent the
extension of market power, as suggested by the courts, 69 or to
hamper the efficient operation of franchising systems and thus re-
,duce their size and the level of social benefits that flow from them.
63 See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1222-23
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp.
636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); Baker, supra note
1, at 1281-82; Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism
and Relational Power, 53 TEx. L. RExv. 1180, 1181 (1975).
04 Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business: Hearings on S. Res. 40
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 497 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
65 U. OZANNE & S. HUNT, supra note 30, at 113-14.
436 Eee L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 46-47; notes 51-54 supra & accompanying
text.
67 See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 379 (5th Cir. 1977); Ungar v. Dunkin" Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211,
1222-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
108 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 1281-82; Hunt, The Socioeconomic Con-
sequences of the Franchise System of Distribution, 36 J. MAPKETNG 32, 33-35
(1972), cited in Ungar v. Dunkin" Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1222-23
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Comment, Franchise Tie-Ins and
Antitrust: A Critical Analysis, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 847, 875.
Vertical integration as an alternative to costly franchising is rendered less
likely if the producer's goods are usually sold through retail outlets which also
offer the goods of other producers and numerous types of other products. See
Williamson, supra note 45, at 979-80.
69 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
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The answer to this question turns on an examination of the pur-
poses and effects of franchise de-ins.
In an early case, the Supreme Court recognized that a tie-in
may benefit purchasers of the tying product by reducing the initial
offering price of that product.70 A person considering purchase
of a fast-food franchise will not pay more than the total value he
expects to receive from use of the franchise. This is true whether
the franchisor attempts to collect his price through one large royalty
payment at the outset or through a markup on supplies he requires
his franchisees to purchase, 71 because the prospective franchisee,
in evaluating the price of the franchise, can be expected to take
into account any markup he must pay on the tied product.72 A
franchisor who requires franchisees to agree to a tying arrangement
must therefore concede a reduced price for the trademark license
to the extent of the markup on the tied product.7 3 Because of these
constraints on his pricing discretion, a franchisor cannot use a
tie-in to extend market power from the tying-product market to the
market for the tied product.74
Why then do franchisors use tying arrangements? In some
cases, use of a tying arrangement may result in certain production
economies.75 In other cases the tie-in may be a quality control
measure used to protect the goodwill of the franchisor's trade-
mark: 76 requiring franchisees to purchase the product from the
franchisor insures that they do not use inferior substitutes. Prob-
ably the best explanation, however, is that a tying arrangement is
the most efficient way for a franchisor to collect the maximum
amount that each franchisee would pay for use of the trademark
if each franchisee could accurately estimate his future return from
70 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
7 1 See generally R. PosNER & F. EASTERBRooK, ANTrnnuST: CASES, EcoNoMIc
NoTEs, A" OTmm MATFrALS 802-04 (2d ed. 1981). See also Baldwin &
McFarland, supra note 1, at 768; Bowman, supra note 1, at 24.
72 See, e.g., Baldwin & McFarland, supra note 1, at 768; Bowman, supra
note 1, at 21.
73 See note 72 supra.
74 The only exception to this statement is the possibility that the tie-in is
being used to create an entry barrier. Such a barrier will not increase the seller's
immediate profit but it will enable the firm to retain its market power over a
longer period and thus increase its long-run profit potential. The entry barrier
problem is discussed at notes 123-37 infra & accompanying text.
75 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 449; Bowman, supra note 1, at 29. This
appears to have been the basis of the decision in Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,
631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 164-68 infra & accompanying
text.
76 See, e.g., R. Posimt, supra note 1, at 175-76; Bowman, supra note 1, at
27-28.
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the enterprise at the time of purchase.77 In such cases, the tied
product serves as a counting or metering device, in that the more
patronage the franchisee receives, the greater will be his demand
for the tied product.
78
A franchisor could accomplish the same result by estimating ex
ante the maximum amount each franchisee would pay for the trade-
mark and charging that amount outright as the total cost of the
franchise. Alternatively, the franchisor could charge a low initial
payment plus royalities calculated as a percentage of sales receipts.79
The first possibility, however, unrealistically assumes that the
franchisor possesses perfect knowledge of his franchisee's individual
demand curves.8 0 This arrangement would also give franchisees a
strong incentive to understate, if asked, the value they expect to
receive from their new franchises."' Additionally, a franchisee is
likely to be risk averse, which would lower the amount of money
he would be willing to invest initially below the franchise's value
in the absence of risk.s2
The second possibility suffers from a similar difficulty. If the
franchisee is required to pay royalties as a percentage of his total
sales, he has an incentive to distort the reported amount of such
sales. Because of this problem, the franchisor would have to police
his franchisees, and the costs of such policing efforts would lower
his profits.
A tying arrangement is likely to be the most attractive alterna-
tive to a franchisor because it enables him to maximize his profits
77The use of the tied product to collect revenue from the sale of the tying
product was suggested in Bowman, supra note 1, at 23-24, and elaborated on in
Burstein, supra note 1, and Markovits (pt. 1), supra note 1, at 1399-1443.
Studies of the franchising industry support the idea that revenue collection is
the primary purpose of most franchise tying arrangements and that quality control
is a secondary motivation. These studies suggest that the franchisors rely on the
tied product sales for a substantial amount of their income and that the tied
product prices are higher than should be expected. See E. Lxwss & R. HANcocu,
supra note 42, at 28-33; U. OzANNE & S. HUNT, supra note 30, at 47, 162. The
revenue collection hypothesis seems to explain these findings better than the quality
control hypothesis.
78 It is assumed here that the tied product is used in proportion to the fran-
chisee's revenues. See text accompanying notes 115-20 infra.
79 This solution has been suggested by courts that oppose tying as a means
of revenue collection. , See note 110 infra & accompanying text.
0 See 0. WnmLiAMSON, MAm=r-s & HmARcums 11-12 (1975); Edwards,
.supra note 1, at 93.
81 Cf. Burstein, supra note 1, at 72 ("Once the tying arrangement is agreed
upon, the purchaser has an obvious incentive to 'cheat' insofar as he can obtain
the tied goods on more favorable terms elsewhere. There is an inherent element
of instability in these arrangements, an element of instability that calls for a
continuous vigil on the part of the tying monopolist.
82 See Burstein, supra note 1, at 72.
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by economizing on the costs of revenue collection. Use of the
tied product as a counting device does not require an initial esti-
mation of the value of the franchise to the franchisee, nor does it
give the franchisee the opportunity to distort the amount of rev-
enue he has earned or expects to earn. The franchisee must pur-
chase the tied product in some proportion to his sales as long as
the tied product is necessary to his operations. Of course, the
franchisee may cheat and order supplies from someone other than
the franchisor, but this type of cheating can be detected relatively
easily in the course of the franchisor's quality control efforts. 83
The leverage theory, which has been used as the primary ra-
tionale for condemning franchise tie-ins,"4 is entirely inconsistent
with this rationale for such tie-ins. Franchisors are not using tie-ins
to create market power in the market for the tied product, but
rather primarily to maximize their profits from the sale of the tying
product. This theoretical observation is confirmed by an examina-
tion of the circumstances under which franchise tie-ins usually
occur. In typical franchise tying cases, the franchisor could not
reasonably have hoped to obtain any substantial market power with
respect to the tied product.85
The revenue collection hypothesis is similar to the frequent
suggestion that tying arrangements are primarily intended to per-
mit the seller to engage in price discrimination.86 The discussion
so far suggests, however, that even when a franchisor has no motive
to attempt price discrimination, because all of his franchisees have
similar earnings from, and hence demand for, their franchises, he
will still have reason to use a tying arrangement to maximize his
profit from the sale of the trademark or franchise license. This
83 Cf. Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising, 17 STAN. L. REv.
926, 933 (1965) (discussing efficiencies of tying in quality control).
84 See Bowman, supra note 1; text accompanying note 10 supra.
85 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Cash v. Arctic Circle, [1980-1] Trade Cas.
V 63,095 (E.D. Wash. 1979). These cases are discussed in note 171 supra and
text accompanying notes 217-21 supra.
s6 See, e.g., R. PosNEre, supra note 1, at 173-74; Bowman, supra note 1, at
24. If the franchisor is using the tying arrangement to price discriminate, he is
in effect tailoring the price he charges each franchisee to the franchisee's ability
to pay. Price discrimination may induce a monopolist to lower his marginal price
and increase his output. See F. ScsrPnx, supra note 38, at 320; 0. AILrmsoN,
supra note 80, at 11. But see R. Posuma, supra note 1, at 177 (noting the absence
of evidence that price discrimination increases output); L. SULLivAN, supra note 5,
at 449-51. Sullivan notes that it is unclear whether price discrimination will bring
in buyers at the lower end of the demand scale. Franchisors appear to believe,
however, that charging a comparatively low initial fee and relying on subsequent




conclusion follows from the fact that, due to problems of risk
aversion and uncertainty, the franchisee is unlikely to be willing
to make a large initial payment.87 Indeed, neither the franchisor
nor the franchisee may be able to estimate the sales level of the new
operation with any accuracy. Furthermore, the franchisee is likely
to distrust representations of profitability made by the franchisor.88
This combination of skepticism and risk aversion will tend to
reduce the initial payment a franchisee will be willing to make.89
A franchisor thus has an incentive to develop a plan under which
payments will be made in proportion to the actual profitability
of the enterprise. Such a plan will increase the present value of the
franchisor's expected earnings by providing for more efficient dis-
tribution of the risk of failure between the two parties 0
The franchisor could accomplish the same result by charging
a large initial fee and providing in the contract for a rebate if
the new facility is not as successful as expected. Negotiating and
enforcing such a contract would be a costly process, however, due
to problems of specifying the conditions under which the refund
will be due and determining when those conditions exist.91
Furthermore, the franchisee will have less of an incentive to effi-
ciently manage the enterprise to the extent that the franchisor will
87 See Burstein, supra note 1, at 69-73 (discussion of why risk and uncertainty
may encourage the seller of a durable product to make use of tying arrangements).
88 This distrust stems not only from the assumed risk aversion of the fran-
chisees, see E. Lvis & B. HANcocx, supra note 42, at 69, but also from the way
in which franchises are typically sold. Franchises are often purchased after only
brief contact between franchisor and franchisee. More importantly, the franchisor
possesses most of the information concerning the potential profitability of the fran-
chise. See id. See also U. OzANNE & S. HUNT, supra note 30, at 38-39; Note,
supra note 34, at 1029. For a technical explication of the economics of asym-
metrically held information, see Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970).
89 See Burstein, supra note 1, at 72.
90 See id. 69-73. In effect, the franchisor is insuring the franchisee against
part of the risk of failure. The franchisor can better bear this risk because his
investment is diversified over many franchises. See generally K. Anmow, EssAYs
N THE THEoRY OF Br.s-B AINC 134-43 (1971).
91 Williamson, supra note 41, at 1442-47, 1469-76, contends that uncertainty,
small numbers exchange relations, opportunism, and the limited ability of human
agents to manage complex information may make some long-term contracts difficult
to negotiate and implement. These problems would be likely to arise in any attempt
to negotiate and enforce a refund clause in a franchise agreement. For example,
the parties would have to specify in the contract the level of effort the franchisee
must put forth in order to entitle him to the refund in the event of failure.
Because the franchisor could not effortlessly determine whether the franchisee was
expending the required effort, he would be forced to continually monitor the fran-
chisee's performance in order to protect against cheating. These costs could largely
be eliminated by use of a tying arrangement, because a franchisee lacking the
possibility of a refund in the event of failure would have greater incentive to
manage the enterprise effectively.
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be unable to detect whether lowered profitability is due to poor
management or to poor forecasting of consumer demand. For these
reasons, a tying arrangement is a way to economize on the transac-
tion costs involved in selling franchises.
A further reason for using a tying arrangement even in the
absence of an intent to price discriminate is the likelihood that the
franchisee will be unable to raise sufficient capital 92 to both make
an investment in the new enterprise, such as constructing the build-
ing or purchasing inventory, and make a large lump sum payment
for the trademark license. If the franchisor is primarily interested
in attracting good managers rather than raising capital, as the more
mature firms may well be,93 it has an incentive to postpone the due
date of payments. As the preceding analysis discloses, a tying ar-
rangement is a convenient way to accomplish this.94
B. The Benefits and Costs of Franchise Tying
The foregoing analysis facilitates a determination of the true
benefits and costs of franchise tying. This section will attempt
such a determination with the aim of laying the groundwork for a
proposed revision of the current per se rule against franchise tying.
1. The Benefits of Franchise Tying
Very few franchisors rely exclusively on an initial payment
from their franchisees as their exclusive source of income. 5 Most
engage in some form of metering, either by charging royalities as a
percentage of sales receipts or by selling goods and services to the
franchisees, in order to increase their profits.9 6 Some franchisors
rely entirely on such payments for their income.97 A likely ex-
planation of this technique is that it enables the franchisor to sell
more franchises than he could by charging a large initial license
fee.98
92 See Comment, supra note 68, at 848.
98See notes 56-57 supra & accompanying text.
94 See text accompanying notes 75-85 supra.
95 See E. LEvws & B. HA~icocK, supra note 42, at 28-33; U. OZANNE &
S. Hu.T, supra note 30, at 47-49; L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 64-65.
96 U. OzANm & S. HUNT, supra note 30, at 4749; L. Rubin, supra note 30,
at 65.
97See McCarthy, supra note 57, at 1091.
98 See id. 1091 & n.30.
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Permitting franchise tie-ins would enable franchisors to col-
lect royalities in a way that is likely to be least costly to them.99
This would save resources which could then be used to produce
additional goods, thus increasing the total value of goods and serv-
ices produced in the economy. The resulting cost savings would
also allow more franchises to be sold. This is so because a fran-
chisor will only sell a franchise if he expects his total revenue from
the sale, the sum of the initial and future payments, to equal or
exceed the cost of supplying the franchise,0 0 with cost defined to
include the services and training supplied to the franchisee, a satis-
factory return on the franchisor's capital, and the revenue collection
costs. If any of these costs are reduced, the franchisor will sell
franchises from which he did not previously expect to receive
sufficient revenue.' 0 ' As more franchises are sold, society benefits
from increased management efficiency, the development of dis-
tributional systems of standardized quality, and increased oppor-
tunities and reduced risk of failure for small businessmen. 02
Franchise tie-ins thus are likely to have substantial benefits which
the law should not neglect.
2. The Costs of Franchise Tie-Ins
a. Price Discrimination and Returns to Market Power
Use of a metering tie-in enables a franchisor with market
power' 03 to price discriminate among franchisees, because those
franchisees who use more of the tied product will end up paying
more for their franchises. The effect of this arrangement is that
each franchisee pays the franchisor an amount approximating his
O0 The franchisor asserted this claim in Mid-America ICEE, [1973-2] Trade
Cas. 1 74,681 (D. Or. 1973).
100 More precisely, the present value of his expected revenue must exceed the
present value of his expected costs as defined in the text (and assuming risk
neutrality).
101 These arguments are based on standard microeconomic theories of supply.
See generally E. MANSFIELD, MIcnoEcoNoz~ncs 26-30, 34-35, 152-60 (3d ed. 1979).
10 2 See text accompanying notes 58-68 supra. Additional benefits will arise to
the extent tie-ins reduce the costs of quality control. This Comment has contended
that such cost reductions are a less likely explanation of franchise tie-ins than the
desire to engage in inexpensive metering. For a different view leading to a similar
result, see Baker, supra note 1, at 1257-58, 1278.
103 A seller cannot profitably attempt to price discriminate among his customers
unless he has some market power to give him some measure of control over price.
F. ScEnmm, supra note 38, at 315.
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individual valuation of the franchise. This increases the return to
the franchisor's market power.104
One potential cost of increasing the returns available from
the possession of market power is that other entrepreneurs will be
encouraged to invest resources in obtaining and holding market
power over the products they sell.105 Largely because of this con-
cern, some commentators who agree with the price discrimination
explanation of tie-ins have concluded that the present per se rule,
although adopted for the wrong reasons, is nevertheless justified. 0 6
Two persuasive reasons suggest, however, that this fear of en-
couraging attempts to acquire market power should not be con-
sidered a social cost of franchise tie-ins. First, high profits in an
industry will normally attract entry of additional firms until prices
are driven down to marginal cost. 0 7 Hence, above-normal short-
term profits are no cause for special concern in the absence of
barriers to entry, which are discussed below. 08 Second, a fran-
chise tying arrangement may serve a number of purposes that yield
real resource savings yet do not necessarily allow the franchisor a
higher than average rate of return. In particular, this Comment
has suggested that tying arrangements are often used as a kind of
deferred payment plan that helps overcome the franchisee's risk
aversion, distrust of franchisor representations of profitability, and
shortage of capital. 0 Such a plan does enable the franchisor to
earn a higher return than he could if he relied entirely on an initial
payment for the franchise, but the source of these higher earnings
is the elimination of inefficiency, not anticompetitive conduct.
In addition, it should be noted that per se prohibition of tie-ins
would be an inadequate response to any such fear of encouraging
expenditure of resources on the acquisition of market power. In
several franchise tying cases, courts have suggested that price dis-
crimination is permissible as long as it is not effected by means of a
tying arrangement." 0 Unless other forms of price discrimination
L04 Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 173-74 (illustrating how a tie-in used to
price discriminate results in a correlation between the user's valuation and the
price he pays).
105 See R. POSNES, supra note 1, at 177.
108 See Burstein, supra note 1; Ferguson, supra note 1.
107 For a discussion of the dynamics of entry, see F. Sciroum, supra note 38,
at 229-66.
108 See text accompanying notes 123-33 infra.
109 See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
110 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell
Co., [1973-2] Trade Cas. f1 74,681 (D. Or. 1973). This view is consistent with
the observation that the price discrimination permitted by a tie-in will neither
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are also banned, the per se rule against tie-ins will not prevent
price discrimination, but merely force franchisors to use a somewhat
less efficient version,"' with a concomitant waste of resources and
little, if any, reduction in incentives to attempt to acquire market
power.
b. Enforcement Inefficiency
Professor Williamson has noted another potential problem in
the case of tie-ins used for price discrimination: the cost of enforc-
ing the tie-in may exceed the benefit the restriction confers, even
though it does not exceed the extra income earned by the seller."
2
Private gain in this case is not congruent with public benefit. In
the case of franchise tie-ins, however, the tying arrangement can be
enforced relatively inexpensively in the course of the already neces-
sary quality control efforts." 3 Furthermore, franchise tie-ins may
be adopted precisely because they allow the franchisor to economize
on certain efforts-maintaining quality control and selling franchises
-in which it must engage regardless of any plan to price discrim-
inate." 4 Because of these two particular characteristics of fran-
chise tie-ins, the enforcement cost problem noted by Professor
Williamson will normally not arise in the franchise-tying context.
c. Price Distortion
Another potential economic cost of franchise tie-ins is the dis-
tortion in prices resulting from the excess of the price of the tied
product over the opportunity cost of the resources used to produce
it." 5 This markup in the price of the tied product is necessary
so that it may serve as a revenue-collection device. At the same
time, however, the markup encourages the franchisee to substitute
enhance nor protect any market power possessed by a seller. See P. ABxzA &
D. Tum i, 3 ANTIR=UST LAw jf733d (1978).
The point made in the text undercuts an argument in Bauer, A Simplified
Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Approach, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 283, 302-03 (1980), that a sufficient ground for holding tie-ins per se
illegal is their effect of shifting resources from buyers to sellers. It is price dis-
crimination, not the tie-in itself, that shifts resources. Because courts are willing
to accept price discrimination, albeit without tie-ins, condemning tying arrange-
ments because of their distributive effects misses the point.
11l For example, franchisors could tie royalty payments to sales receipts. See
text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
112 Williamson, supra note 41, at 1447.
"1
3 See note 31 supra & accompanying text.
"1
4 See notes 76 and 86-90 supra & accompanying text.
"1
5 See L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 34-36.
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other products for the tied product." 6  If the prices of all inputs
reflected their marginal costs prior to the imposition of the tie-in,
this substitution would lead to inefficient production, since the rise
in the price of the tied good would not reflect an increase in the
actual resource cost of its production." 7  This problem may be
avoided if, for technological reasons, the franchisee must use the
tied product in fixed proportion to other inputs," 8 or if the fran-
chisor requires the franchisee to use a production technique that
requires use of a fixed proportion of the tied product."19 The
franchisor may also spread the markup over a number of tied
products in order to reduce the incentive to substitute away from
the tied good. 20 These provisions, however, may make it more
costly to police the franchise contract.
Furthermore, even if distortion were found to occur, it, like
price discrimination, affords a poor justification for a per se rule
or for treble damages or criminal liability. The franchisor is per-
fectly free to charge royalties as a percentage of sales,' 2 ' but if he
does so distortion may be produced because the franchisee will
have an incentive to produce less than he otherwise would. 2 2 Here,
116 Id.
17 This point can be illustrated through a simple example. Assume the
following:
Marginal Cost of Production Price Under Tie-In
Good X $10 $13
Good Y $12 $12
Assume also that prior to the tie-in the marginal cost equalled the price of the
good to the franchisee, that marginal cost reflects the cost to society of producing
the good, and that X and Y are substitutes. Good X is the tied good.
Prior to the tie-in, the franchisee would buy good X. This is an efficient
solution because production of X costs less than production of Y. After the tie-in
has been imposed, the franchisee is required to buy X, but at a higher price.
Good Y now is less expensive to the franchisee, but is still more costly to society.
The consequent incentive for the franchisee to substitute Y for X is inefficient.
Another possibility is that the franchisee will continue to use the tied good
but will alter his production function to use less of that input. See generally
E. MANSFiELD, supra note 101, at 146-49.
118 L. Rubin, supra note 30, at 36.
19 Id.
12 0 In Bauer, supra note 5, at 303, the author argues that the use of multiple
product tie-ins demonstrates that franchisors are attempting to obtain market power
in the tied product markets because price discrimination could be achieved with
only one tied product. Bauer does not explain, however, why a franchisor would
benefit by obtaining monopolies over products used by his franchisees. The better
explanation for this phenomenon is that by spreading the markup over several
products the franchisor reduces the franchisees' incentives to engage in input
substitution.
121 See note 110 supra & accompanying text.
122 The franchisee will perceive the royalty fee as an addition to his marginal
cost curve. He will thus produce less than if the royalties were charged as a
lump sum payment. See Rubin, supra note 30, at 65-66.
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as with the price discrimination rationale, liability would depend
on how the undesirable effect was produced rather than on its
existence.
d. Entry Barriers
A very serious objection to tying in general is the possibility
that it might result in entry barriers. For example, Kaysen and
Turner have argued that a tie-in will always raise an entry barrier
in the market for the tied good to the same level as any entry bar-
riers in the tying-product market, because a seller will have to
supply both the tied and tying products "since he must be able to
displace the whole package which the tying offers." 123
Although adhered to by some,124 this view has been disputed
by those who argue that such an entry barrier will arise only when
the two products are complementary'25 or when there are no rea-
sonable substitutes for the tying product. 26  In addition, it has
been suggested that a tie-in will only raise an entry barrier if the
elasticity of demand for the tied product is relatively low 127 and
the tied product market is so small relative to the available scale
economies that the customers not covered by the tying arrangement
will be too few "to support a sufficiently large number of efficient
size producers to keep that general market effectively competitive
and the price charged to the non-tied buyers at the competitive
level." 128 Kaysen and Turner's view has also been criticized as
invalid except in cases in which there are no uses for the tied good
except in connection with the tying product.
12
But even with these qualifications, the phenomenon that Kay-
sen and Turner pointed to may fail to satisfy the criterion for an
entry barrier that most economists now employ. The definition of
an entry barrier now generally accepted by economists is a cost that
differentially affects a new entrant as compared with firms already
123 C. KAYsE & D. TuaNER, supra note 5, at 157.
124 See, e.g., L. SULavAN, supra note 5, at 447-48; Logic of Foreclosure,
supra note 5, at 92-93. See also Baldwin & McFarland, supra note 1, at 773
("The tying clause creates a barrier to entry. In most cases, it will increase the
capital investment needed by a potential entrant, as he may have to produce a
substitute for the tying product in order to enter the market for the tied product.").
125 Edwards, supra note 1, at 98.
126 Pearson, supra note 1, at 638.
127 Edwards, supra note 1, at 99.
128 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Burstein, supra note 1, at 94 n.80;
Pearson, supra note 1, at 638.
129 Ferguson, supra note 1, at 563.
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in the market. 3 0 That a new entrant into one field would also
have to produce another product because of a tying arrangement
would not necessarily produce such a cost differential, because the
firm responsible for the tying arrangement would also have to sup-
ply both products. For this to constitute an entry barrier, produc-
ing both products would have to be more difficult for new entrants
than for the existing producer.
The necessity for a new entrant to enter both fields simul-
taneously may constitute an entry barrier if the existing producer
was able to enter one field initially and only later undertook to
supply the second product. Such a new entrant may face higher cap-
ital costs because of lenders' uncertainty about the entrant's ability
to perform if he lacks experience or a reputation for success in
any field.131 A new entrant may also incur higher management
costs in assembling the necessary skills to enter both fields simul-
taneously in the absence of "perfect fluidity of talent and re-
sources." 132
Concerns about entry-barrier effects of tying arrangements are
no more warranted in the franchising context than elsewhere, be-
cause it is unlikely that new entrants into either the tying or tied
product market will have to enter both markets simultaneously.
Most tie-ins will not pose entry barrier problems when franchisors
are using them as metering devices or for quality-control purposes.
If a franchisor is using a tie-in solely as a metering device, he will
allow others to produce the tied product if they can do so more
efficiently. 13 3 If the tying arrangement is being used solely for
quality-control purposes, the franchisor may insist on producing the
product himself, but this will be because it is the most efficient
way to protect the consumer goodwill associated with the fran-
chise trademark,13 4 not because of predatory designs.
An entry barrier is only likely to arise when a franchisor uses
a tying arrangement to pursue strategic objectives. The franchisor's
control of production in the tied product market may then confront
potential competitors with the prospect of having to simultaneously
enter production of two products. 1' Most tying arrangements do
13 0 Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925,
945 (1979), citing G. Snci.Im, THE ORGANIZAToN OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968).
131 Williamson, supra note 41, at 1456-58.
1
3 2 L. Su.Lr A., supra note 5, at 448.
133 B. POSNER, supra note 1, at 175.
134 Id.
'3 Consider the case in which a tie-in has enabled a franchisor to become the
sole producer of the tied product. The franchisor's new competitors would then
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not in fact give sellers control of the tied product market.1 6 Never-
theless, the theoretical possibility does exist, and one recent case
suggests that a tying arrangement may be used as part of a strategy
to maintain a monopoly in the franchisor's product market.13T
The entry barrier problem therefore should play some role in any
new legal rule for franchise tying arrangements.
e. Market Foreclosure
Several authors have argued that tying arrangements should
be condemned because they tend to reduce competition in the man-
ufacture of the tied product,'l38 thus reducing pressures to develop
more efficient methods of operation. 13 9 The previous analysis has
demonstrated, however, that only when a tying arrangement is
used to create an entry barrier will it reduce the number or size
of firms in the tied product market below that dictated by normal
economic forces.140 This theoretical analysis is supported by the
observation that many franchisors do use tied products which are
manufactured by others. 141 The desire to protect "competition on
the merits" 142 in the tied product market is thus consistent with
permitting franchise tying arrangements except in those cases in
be forced to produce the tied product as well if adequate substitutes were not
available at reasonable prices, if the franchisor refused to sell the tied product to
entrants at competitive prices, and if convergent-expectations problems prevented
the simultaneous entry of new producers of the tied product. Convergent-
expectations problems are noted in R. PosuN & F. EAsTrmBrtoo, supra note 71,
at 808, and are discussed more generally in Williamson, supra note 41, at 1459-60.
'
36 See P. AnEEDA, ANrrusT ANA.Ysis 570 (2d ed. 1974) ("Monopoly in
the tied product is both rare and not often threatened by most actual tying
arrangements.").
1371n Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980), the defendant sold camera products and film process-
ing through franchised and company-owned drive-through kiosks. Id. 707. Accord-
ing to the appellate court, Fotomat intended to preempt the desirable sites for
such kiosks nationally. Id. 715. The court also noted the district court's finding
that Fotomat required its franchisees to lease the land and kiosks from the parent
firm even though the franchisees were capable of finding suitable sites on their own
or of purchasing them from the defendant. Id. 724-25. This tying arrangement
may have been part of a strategy to deter entry by enabling Fotomat to maintain
control of the sites to which potential competitors would be attracted. Control of
these sites might have been lost if the sites had simply been sold to the franchisees.
138 See L. Sur.LivAN, supra note 5, at 447; Bauer, supra note 5, at 298-99;
Turner, supra note 5, at 60-62.
13 9 See L. SurLwvAN, supra note 5, at 447.
140 See notes 133-35 supra & accompanying text.
' 41 Bauer, supra note 5, at 303.
142 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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which the practice is part of a strategy to maintain the franchisor's
market position.
143
f. The Loss of Free Choice
From an economic perspective, loss of free choice is not a cost
of franchise tying arrangements; by agreeing to the franchise con-
tract the franchisee has indicated that the value to him of selecting
alternatives to the tied product is less than the value of the package
offered by the franchisor. Nevertheless, some authorities argue that
free choice values are important in any legal analysis of the prob-
lem. Courts have indicated some fear that tie-ins may deprive
purchasers of free choice between alternative sellers of the tied
product.144 Professor Sullivan, expressing a similar view, has sug-
gested that the present tying doctrine is based more on concerns
about economic decentralization than on a desire to promote eco-
nomic efficiency.
145
Buyer free choice is, however, only one of the values that the
present rule is designed to serve. It has never been seriously sug-
gested that an infringement of free choice is by itself a sufficient
ground on which to base an antitrust violation.'4" In the context
of franchising, allegations of loss of free choice may be based on a
franchisee's desire to improve his position within a contractual
relationship into which he freely entered. 14 7 Without requiring
coercion to be accompanied by an anticompetitive effect to consti-
tute an antitrust violation, courts might become refuges for un-
happy businessmen seeking solace in the pursuit of treble damages. 148
143 One recent article attempts to show that the present law of tying arrange-
ments is defective by arguing that this rationale for the tie-in prohibition-the
desire to protect competition on the merits-was repudiated in the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). Baker, supra note 1. This demonstration is unnecessary, however, be-
cause most franchise tie-ins will not distort production of the tied product. The
most efficient producers of the tied product will prevail with or without the tying
arrangement.
144 See note 12 supra & accompanying text
145 L. SuLr.aVAN, supra note 5, at 448.
246 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21
(1977). Cf. Turner, supra note 5, at 60-61 (arguing that the primary concern of
courts in tying cases is probably with "free access" to the tied product market
rather than with "free choice"); Logic of Foreclosure, supra note 5, at 92-93.
14 7 See Ungar v. Dunkin" Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223 (3d Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
14 8 See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978):
Dealings between a manufacturer and its agents may be arbitrary, unfair,
or lacking in good business judgment, but, without more, they will not
violate the [Sherman] Act. The Sherman Act is not a "panacea for all
business affronts which seem to fit nowhere else .. "
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Infringement on franchisee free choice is thus a poor justifica-
tion for a per se rule against franchise tying arrangements. In view
of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,149 it is also doubtful that free choice
should be a significant factor in a rule of reason analysis of such
arrangements. 150 The Court held in Sylvania that non-price vertical
restrictions imposed unilaterally by a manufacturer on its distribu-
tors were not per se illegal but were to be judged under a rule of
reason.151 The Court noted that, although they may reduce intra-
brand competition, vertical restraints are most often intended to
improve the manufacturer's market position relative to that of
competing manufacturers. 52 Because a manufacturer can rarely
abuse its ability to restrain intrabrand competition to attain ob-
jectives in the interbrand market,' 53 the Court indicated that the
reasonableness of vertical market restraints may be judged by bal-
ancing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, 54 even
though it recognized that the freedom of independent retailers is
restrained to some extent by such restrictions. 15
The Court did not precisely define how its rule of reason
approach should be applied. The opinion does suggest, however,
that vertical market restrictions should be assessed by "balancing
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects," I56 and by placing
emphasis on "market considerations." 1 Lower federal courts
analyzing vertical restrictions in the light of Sylvania have focused
While the antitrust law has given more than a mere nod to the im-
portance of business autonomy, respect for independence cannot justify
finding a violation when no adverse impact on competition is shown. The
Supreme Court has expressly rejected business autonomy as the basis for
a per se rule against territorial restraints imposed on distributors who own
the goods they sell. Followed to its logical conclusion, Kestenbaum's
theory would subject a manufacturer to treble damage liability for any
provision in a franchise agreement which turned out, in retrospect, to
have been a bad business decision. This is not the purpose for which
the Sherman Act was designed.
Id. 571-72 (citations omitted).
149 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
150 See Baker, supra note 1.
3.51 Id. 58-59.
152 Id. 57-58.
'53 Id. 52 n.19.
154 See, e.g., Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-89 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Zelek, Stem & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason
Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CA=.F. L. Env. 13 (1980); Comment, Vertical
Agreement as Horizontal Restraint: Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 128
U. PA. L. REv. 622, 635 (1980).
155 433 U.S. at 46.
IN Id. 57 n.27.
157 Id. 53 n.21.
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on the economic effects of such practices rather than on free choice
concerns.158 Sylvania and its progeny thus lend support to the view
that franchise tying arrangements should be analyzed solely in
terms of their effect on competition.
But even accepting the possibility that maximization of free
choice should remain an important value in the antitrust analysis
of tying arrangements, it is still doubtful that it affords a basis for
condemning a franchise tying arrangement. By enabling fran-
chisors to reduce their operating expenses, such arrangements may
allow the firms to sell more franchises,159 thus providing some
individuals with an option they would not otherwise have. Many
persons become franchisees precisely because of their desire to in-
crease their independence.160 The net effect of a tie-in on the level
of individual autonomy is therefore uncertain, and to prohibit the
practice on the basis of free choice concerns could have an effect
opposite to the one intended.
IV. THE UNCERTAINTY AND INCONVENIENCE OF THE PRESENT RuLE
This Comment has shown that many franchise tie-ins promote
economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs without greatly
impinging upon, and in many cases promoting, the social goals of
the antitrust laws. Only when a barrier to entry is created might
anticompetitive effects outweigh efficiency gains.
These observations alone, however, merely raise another issue.
The ability of the courts to effectively administer a new approach
to tying arrangements must also be considered. One explanation
offered for the courts' reluctance to consider the efficiency justifica-
tions of tie-ins is the difficulty they experience in evaluating eco-
nomic arguments and their preference for the relative certainty
and convenience of the present per se rule. 6 1
The following discussion will suggest, however, that, although
their importance often goes unacknowledged, economic concerns
already intrude significantly into the law of tie-ins. Moreover, it
will be shown that the present rule is not necessarily more certain
or more convenient than a more lenient approach.
158 See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807,
813-14 (10th Cir. 1977); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470,
474-75 (D.D.C. 1977). See also E. KNrrnmx, supra note 23, § 10.48, at 218-19
(and cases cited therein).
159 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
160 E. LE vs & R. IHANcocx, supra note 42, at 17.
161 See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.
1977) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)),
quoted in note 6 supra.
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A. The Uncertainty and Inconvenience of the
Present "Per Se" Rule
1. The Two Product Requirement
The initial question in all tie-in cases is whether the tying and
tied products are distinct or form a single package of items. 62
Efficiency concerns play a large role here, although the courts
usually articulate other rationales in their opinions.
163
A recent example of this tendency is Principe v. McDonald's
Corp. 64  This case presented the question whether a franchisor
was guilty of an illegal tie-in because franchisees were forced
to lease their places of business from it. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's determination that no tying arrangement
was involved because the franchisor was selling only a single pack-
age of goods and services.165 The court concluded that the practice
of selling the lease and trademark license together was an essential
factor in the franchisor's success and that it benefited the franchisees
as well. 16 This conclusion was based on a finding that the fran-
chisor was able to obtain better sites than franchisees could select
or acquire as a result of its scale economies and experience in
franchising.167  The court's conclusion that no illegal tie-in existed
was thus based on an efficiency defense even though the court's
stated rationale was that the store lease was "not separable from the
McDonald's franchise to which it pertains." 168
2. The Market Power Requirement
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant franchisor has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to
appreciably restrain competition in the tied product market.169 In
162 See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394
U.S. 495, 507 (1969). See generally E. KNmTNER, supra note 23, at 228-35;
Levy, supra note 18.
1G3 See L. SUrVt.AN, supra note 5, at 449. See also Levy, supra note 18, at
51 n.52 (noting the existence of a business justification test).





169 E.g., U.S. Steel v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610
(1977); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
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Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., the Ninth Circuit abbreviated
this inquiry into a franchisor's market power by presuming sufficient
market power from the trademark on the tying product.
170
If economic concerns were truly too cumbersome for judicial
evaluation, one might expect other courts to follow this lead and
avoid the need for a detailed inquiry into a franchisor's market
power. The present trend, however, appears to be in the opposite
direction.171 Other courts require the plaintiff to base its proof of
a franchisor's market power upon a showing that the franchisor's
trademark was so unique and desirable that the franchisor would
be able to increase prices or force a significant number of buyers
to accept burdensome terms. 72 Under this type of inquiry, the
complexities of market definition and market share continue to play
an important role. 73 This type of complex inquiry weakens the
present rule's claim to certainty and convenience.
170448 F.2d 43, 48-50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
Some courts have interpreted Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., as resting on the
economic power of the particular franchisor in that case. See, e.g., Cash v. Arctic
Circle, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. 163,095 (E.D. Wash. 1979); Esposito v. Mister
Softee, Inc., [1976-2] Trade Cas. f 61,202 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Chicken Delight did
indeed hold a preeminent position in the fast food industry, as the court of appeals
recognized, 448 F.2d at 49, but this was not the basis of the court's holding.
The court's decision instead turned on its view of the registered trademark as a
legal barrier to competition. Id. 50. The court in effect treated a trademark like
a patent or copyright. Id.
171In Cash v. Arctic Circle, [1980-1] Trade Cas. 1 63,095 (E.D. Wash. 1979),
a district court refused to assign a presumption of economic power to trademarks,
and distinguished Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), as relying on the market power of the particular
franchisor in that case. [1980-1] Trade Cas. f1 63,095, at 77,441-43. The defend-
ant ice cream franchisor in Cash required its franchisees to purchase syrups and
toppings from it as a condition of the trademark license. Id. 77,441. The fran-
chisees' suit sought to recover the damages they suffered as a result of being forced
to pay noncompetitive prices for the tied products. Id. 77,443. In refusing to
accept the presumption of economic power for trademarks, the court noted that a
trademark only serves to prevent the piracy of trade names and the resulting
deception of the public. Id. 77,442.
This is not the only example of a refusal to follow Siegel. The Second
Circuit has consistently refused to assign a presumption of economic power to
trademarks. See Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663-65
(2d Cir. 1974); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dis-
missed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., [1976-21 Trade Cas.
91 61,202 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Other circuits have similarly refused to base a finding
of legally sufficient market power on a trademark alone. See Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 725 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 917
(1980); Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48
(5th Cir. 1976).
172Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48
(5th Cir. 1976).
173 See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 725 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542
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3. The Efficiency-Based New Industry and
Goodwill Defenses
Economic concerns have also modified the "per se" rule
against tying arrangements through the establishment of the new
industry and goodwill protection defenses. The new industry de-
fense will save a tie-in from illegality if the tie-in is shown to be
essential to protect the industry during its early stages of develop-
ment. 74 The defense is not a very significant one, however, be-
cause it operates only during an industry's early stages and requires
the absence of any other suitable means of protecting the defend-
ant's reputation.17 5
The goodwill protection defense is of greater significance to
franchising. It permits tie-ins that are necessary to the protection
of the goodwill associated with the franchisor's trademark, unless
an alternative arrangement, such as specifying the characteristics
of the good to be used, is practicable. 70 A less restrictive alterna-
tive will not be considered practicable if the tied product is too
complex for a set of acceptable characteristics to be given to the
franchisee.1
77
An economist would agree with the principles behind the new
industry' 7" and goodwill defenses. 7 9 Both defenses rest upon
F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Cash v. Arctic
Circle, [1980-1] Trade Cas. 7 63,095, at 77,443 (E.D. Wash. 1979).
'
7 4 See United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
175 See id. 556-57.
170 See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1977); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d
39, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally E. KhNINE, supra note 23, at 257-61.
177See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 306 (1949)).
Professor Posner has criticized the courts' failure to give greater weight to the
goodwill-protection defense. He contends that, by requiring suppliers to rely on
quality specifications instead of tie-ins for quality control, courts may be fostering
inefficient business practices. R. PosNtr, supra note 1, at 175. See also Baker,
supra note 1, at 1249-51.
178 See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 45, at 965:
[A]Ithough [vertical restrictions] may be needed to ensure viability at an
early stage in an industry's development, a more mature industry may be
able to support the requisite distribution system without the same need
for [such] restraints .... Thus, although forward integration may repre-
sent an effort to realize private gains with resulting economies at one
stage, it may constitute an unneeded restraint at a later stage and indeed
may serve strategically to disadvantage rivals if it is continued.
179 See Bowman, supra note 1, at 27; note 177 supra.
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cognizance of the free rider problem 180 facing the franchisor in
preserving the customer goodwill associated with its trademark.
It would be a small additional step for courts to recognize that pro-
hibiting tie-ins may force franchisors to adopt more costly alterna-
tives to tying arrangements to enforce quality standards or collect
revenue.
4. The Individual Coercion Requirement
The complexity of the present rule is further increased by the
individual coercion doctrine. 8 1 This requirement is a necessary
product of the per se approach, which may encourage the franchisee
"'to sue for the treble damage windfall . . .regardless of the sig-
nificance of the restraint and notwithstanding the fact that he paid
no more than he would have paid in the form of a franchise
fee." 182 The coercion requirement attempts to alleviate this prob-
lem by insisting upon a showing that at least a modicum of pressure
was exerted upon the franchisee in order to force him to accept
the tie-in. 83
Because evidence of coercion normally goes to show the exist-
ence of a tying arrangement, a formal tying agreement will usually
obviate the need to show coercion.8 4 If, however, the contract does
not require the purchase of the tied product, evidentiary problems
are likely to arise. 8 5 One court has found that proof of coercion
could be based on indirect evidence, such as the existence of
clearly burdensome terms coupled with economic power on the part
180 In a system of franchised retail or distribution outlets, each franchisee has
an incentive to reduce the quality of service he provides below the optimal level,
because the level of patronage he receives is determined by the reputation of the
enterprise as a whole as well as by the reputation of his individual operation.
Each franchisee thus has an incentive to "free ride" on the goodwill associated
with the trademark, and the franchisor must engage in policing efforts to maintain
uniform standards. Cf. R. POSNa, supra note 1, at 149-50 (discussing free rider
problems in the context of restrictions on distribution). See also text accompanying
note 31 supra.
181 See text accompanying notes 19 & 28 supra. See generally Austin, supra
note 1.
182 Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223 n.10 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). See also E. KruTa, supra note 23,
§ 10.59 (and cases cited therein).
183 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211,
1218, 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
184 See note 183 supra. But see Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp.,
506 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that even a formal agreement incor-
porating a tie-in is not an illegal tying arrangement in the absence of proof that
the licensee objected to the package); note 189 infra.
185 See E. KnIrNTEH, supra note 23, § 10.59, at 252-56 (and cases cited therein).
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of the seller. 86 Other courts have required the plaintiff to show that
he was actually forced or pressured into accepting the tie.187 It is
sometimes not even clear to which aspect of the law the coercion
requirement relates. Although it is usually discussed in the con,
text of the question whether a tie-in exists, 8 8 it may also influence
the court's evaluation of the defendant's economic power.189
B. An Appraisal of The Present Rule
The theoretically straightforward ban against franchise tie-ins
is thus not as simple as it first appears. Economic concerns, albeit
in disguised form, seem already to have crept into the law. Further-
more, the present law may pose evidentiary problems that require
detailed investigation, particularly in regard to assessing the defend-
ant's market power and determining whether the plaintiff was
coerced into the tie-in. The uncertainties surrounding the two
product requirement, the market power test, and the new industry
and goodwill defenses tend to reduce the predictability of the law
as well as complicate the court's analysis. Indeed, it seems quite
possible that the law would be clearer if efficiency concerns were
acknowledged outright rather than being camouflaged behind such
vague requirements as -the two product rule.
It is necessary, however, to also acknowledge the limitations on
the capacity of the courts to engage in economic analysis. What
is needed, then, is an approach that incorporates fuller considera-
tion of the actual effects of franchise tie-ins without significantly
increasing the investigatory burden upon the courts.
V. A NEw APPROACH
A. The Proposed Test
Courts that have been confronted with revenue collection or
quality control defenses to franchise tie-in illegality have generally
refused to accept them, stating that less restrictive means are avail-
186 Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1977).
187 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1977); Response
-of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Ungar
v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976).
188 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977); Ungar v.
Dunkin" Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976).
189 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 451 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing
,Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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able to collect royalties or to protect the goodwill associated with the
trademark. 90 The preceding analysis has suggested that this ap-
proach is likely to lead to transaction-cost inefficiencies and thus
make it more difficult to develop and operate franchise systems.' 9 '
At the same time, courts are unlikely to sanction all franchise
tie-ins, and it is by no means clear that all franchise tie-ins are
desirable. 92 In particular, the courts need a test that is both man-
ageable and capable of isolating those franchise tie-ins with poten-
tial anti-competitive effects. A typical rule of reason approach 19s
would throw open the gates to all concerns that ingenious counsel
can think of. This Comment's proposal should be more useful to
the courts.
One possible approach to formulating a workable test would be
to incorporate all the potential costs and benefits of tie-ins dis-
cussed in this Comment. A number of these costs, however, have
been shown to be of little significance in the franchise setting.9 4
Additionally, several of these potential costs would be difficult for
courts to evaluate. For example, it would be very difficult for a
court to determine whether a franchise tie-in is likely to increase
the level of resources devoted to obtaining and holding market
power. The court would first have to ascertain whether the tie-in
was being used primarily as a metering device. 95 Next, it would
be necessary to decide whether the function of the tie-in was pri-
marily to increase profits above the theoretical single price mo-
nopoly profit level or to distribute risk between the franchisor and
franchisee. 90 Finally, the court would have to ask whether the
franchisor's price discrimination, where it was found to exist, pri-
marily encouraged new entry into his product market or efforts to
190 See note 110 supra.
191 See notes 75-90 supra & accompanying text.
19 2 For example, tie-ins may lead to substitution away from the tied product,
see text accompanying notes 115-20 supra, or to erection of entry barriers, see text
accompanying notes 123-37 supra. The potential distortion caused by tying arrange-
ments is sometimes ignored by those advocating a change in the law. See, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 1.
193 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(Brandeis, J.). But cf. National Socty of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978) (advancing a rule of reason limited to inquiry into
competitive effects).
1
9 4 See notes 103-14 supra & accompanying text.
195 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
196 For a diagrammatic comparison of the theoretical profits obtainable through
single price monopoly and price discrimination, see Williamson, supra note 41, at
1447-48. The theoretical distinction between metering to distribute risk and




obtain monopolies in other fields.197 This would require intract-
able factual investigation. 98
The major potential anticompetitive effect of franchise tie-ins,
and the easiest one for courts to evaluate, is the creation of a bar-
tier to entry into the franchisor's product market 99  This prob-
lem is therefore the primary focus of the proposed test, which
will now be summarized. The burden of proof for showing that
the tying arrangement had created a potential entry barrier would
be a part of the plaintiff's case. If this burden was met, and the
defendant was unable to rebut the evidence presented, an anti-
competitive effect would be presumed to exist.200 Because fran-
chise tie-ins may also have procompetitive effects, the defendant
would be permitted to show the beneficial aspects of the practice.
If the court found that the arrangement had both pro- and anticom-
petitive effects, these would be balanced in accordance with the
guidelines suggested below.201
The elements of the plaintiff's case under this approach can
be incorporated within the framework of the present rule. First,
the plaintiff would be required, as he is now,20 2 to show that two
distinct products exist. If the tying and tied products are such
that they would ordinarily be produced or sold together because
-of economies of joint production or distribution, then the tie-in
197 See notes 103-08 supra & accompanying text.
198 Courts would also find it very difficult to evaluate the distortion caused by
an increase in the price of the tied product. Little distortion is likely to occur in
most cases, because the franchisor has both the power and the incentive to prevent
substitution for the tied product. See Rubin, supra note 30, at 36; notes 118-20
.supra & accompanying text.
199 See notes 123-37 supra & accompanying text.
200 Because most plaintiffs in franchise tying cases are franchisees, it would be
impractical to require proof that entry actually had been deterred. The franchisee-
plaintiff would often have no way of knowing if others had considered entry but
'had been deterred by high capital costs or the difficulty of assembling the man-
agerial talent necessary to enter two industries simultaneously. See text accom-
panying notes 131-32 supra. The crucial concern should therefore be whether the
franchisor's control of the tied product market would force a new entrant into one
market to commence operations in the other field at substantially the same time.
The likelihood that an entry barrier would result from the tying arrangement is a
-sufficient basis for antitrust scrutiny.
2 0
, See text accompanying notes 212-16 infra.
This proposed test is similar to one suggested by Sullivan. L. SuLravAN,
supra note 5, at 452. Sullivan, however, would require a showing, when a tie-in
has been used to price discriminate, that the price discrimination "extended the
use of the tied product and did no injury to resale competition." Id. The test
proposed here concentrates instead on transaction cost economies and entry barriers.
Baker also suggests a relaxed approach to tying arrangements, see Baker,
.supra note 1, at 1317-19, but offers no specific guidelines for applying the rule of
reason he advocates. The test proposed herein is more precise in its focus.
20 2 See note 162 supra.
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is merely the result of proper functioning of the competitive process
and should not be prohibited.
Second, the plaintiff would be required to show that the fran-
chisor possessed substantial economic power in the market for the
good or service it retails. If the product is being sold competitively,
the franchisor has no market power to protect by creating an entry
barrier, and resource allocation will not be improved by encourag-
ing entry into such a market. The requisite economic power
would not be presumed because the good or service was trade-
marked; instead, the plaintiff would be required to show that the
defendant's product was significantly differentiated from those sold
by its competitors.203  Alternatively, the complainant could show
that the franchisor's trademark was particularly desirable to po-
tential franchisees, because the desirability of the trademark will
normally reflect consumer preference for the good or service pro-
vided by the franchise system and thus indicate the franchisor's
market power.
The substantial effect on commerce requirement would also
be retained, but it, like the market power requirement, would be
modified to make it more compatible with an entry barrier test.
The plaintiff would be required to show that the tying arrange-
ment had enabled the franchisor to control production of a sub-
stantial share of the tied product market. The meaning of "sub-
stantial" in this context should depend on the minimum scale at
which the new entrant is required to operate. If one of the fran-
chisor's potential competitors could initially open a small number
of outlets and gradually build up his system, only a small amount
of the tied product market would have to remain independent
for the franchisor to escape liability. If, on the other hand, the
203 One recent article suggests that the Supreme Court adopted a low eco-
nomic power threshold for tying products in U.S. Steel v. Fortner Enterprises
(Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610 (1977). See Baker, supra note 1, at 1255-56. The
assertion that the Court adopted "a minimal market power standard" in Fortner II,
see id. 1248, is, however, inconsistent with the Court's statement that "the question
is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the
market for the tying product," 429 U.S. at 620, and with the Court's concern that
the defendant's product be "significantly differentiated" from the products offered
by its competitors. Id. 622.
Given these statements and the line of cases discussed in note 171 supra, a
trademark by itself would seem to be an insufficient basis for a presumption of
economic power. Although trademarks are often "associated intimately with the
process of product differentiation," Baker, supra note 1, at 1256, they also serve
other functions, such as encouraging quality-control efforts and reducing the time
consumers must spend testing products subject to quality variations, F. ScHErEn,
supra note 38, at 378. A good or service may be trademarked and yet face
substantial competition because a number of equally acceptable substitutes are
available to consumers. The plaintiff under the proposed test would therefore be
required to show the uniqueness of the franchisor's product.
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new entrant would have to build a large network of outlets quickly
in order, for example, to develop consumer preference for the
product or to take advantage of economies of scale, a larger share
of the tied product market would have to remain independent.
204
In addition, the speed at which independent producers of the tied
product could expand the scale of their operations should be con-
sidered. If they could expand rapidly, no entry barrier exists even
if a new entrant would have to start at a large scale.
By concentrating on the question whether the tying arrange-
ment permits substantial control of the tied product market, the
proposed test incorporates to some extent the concerns of those
who believe that tie-ins will reduce competitive pressures in the
tied product market.20 5 Thus, because the test does not require
a showing that the practice was intended to create a barrier to
entry, it condemns all tying arrangements that would give the fran-
chisor control of the tied product market and would not have
significant procompetitive effects. It is precisely such arrangements
that are likely to reduce competitive pressures in the tied product
market.
In contrast to the present law,206 a plaintiff franchisee under
this test would not have to show that he was coerced into accept-
ing the tying arrangement. If no anticompetitive effect was shown
by the plaintiff, coercion need not be examined because liability
would not result in any case. If a potential entry barrier was
demonstrated and no redeeming procompetitive effects shown, the
tie-in would be condemned because of its anticompetitive effects
even in the absence of coercion.
If the franchisor is unable to rebut the plaintiff's evidence,
he should be allowed to introduce other evidence to demonstrate
the procompetitive effects of the tying arrangement. One way to
approach this would be to allow the franchisor to introduce evi-
dence of his transaction-cost savings and the resulting increase in
his sale of franchises. The difficult task of directly estimating
output, however, may exceed a court's capabilities.20 7 A better
204 One of the major advantages of franchising is that it may increase demand
for the firm's product by providing a system of retail outlets that consumers can
trust to be of uniform quality. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. In
order to expand demand in this way, however, the franchisor may need to operate
on a large scale so that a substantial number of consumers will gain experience
with the service or product that the firm provides.
205 See notes 138-39 supra & accompanying text.
206 See text accompanying notes 181-89 supra.
2o Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CM. L. ERv. 6, 21 (1981). Posner notes that exogenous
variables may influence changes in the firm s output
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approach would be for the court to examine the attributes of the
particular franchise system and from these deduce whether it is
likely that the tying arrangement has so reduced transaction costs
that the franchisor can operate more efficiently and at a significantly
larger scale. 2
08
Several attributes of the franchise system should be considered
by the court. The first is the geographical distribution of the fran-
chises. To the extent that the franchises are spread out over a
wide area, the franchisor can make use of a tying arrangement to
economize on policing costs. 20 9 A second characteristic to be noted
is the relationship of the tied product to quality control. In one
case, for example, an iced drink franchisor required its franchisees
to purchase from it the drink-making machine that was identified
with the franchisor's trademark, as well as some minor items such
as cups.2 10 The former item is reasonably related to quality con-
trol; the latter is not. Also relevant to the court's inquiry are the
amount of investment required of new franchisees and their average
levels of business experience and available capital. The higher the
total initial investment per franchise and the lower the new oper-
ators' capital and experience, the more likely it is that the fran-
chisor is using the tying arrangement as a form of deferred payment
plan that redistributes the risk of failure between franchisor and
franchisee211 in order to economize on the efforts required to
market franchises. Finally, the court should consider the extent
to which franchisors with similar product lines have been able to
operate successfully without the use of a tying arrangement.
In some cases, a court will find a franchise tying arrangement
that allows the franchisor to produce all or most of the tied product
but that does not yield significant operating economies. In such
208 Although such an approach may at first seem impractical or vague, it is
very similar to the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631
F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980). The result reached in Principe provided a very
teasonable solution to the competing interests at stake in that case.
209 The policing costs involved in both revenue collection and the maintenance
of quality control are likely to rise if the franchises are distributed over a wide
area, thus making the use of a tying arrangement more attractive from an efficiency
standpoint.
210 Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., [1973-2] Trade Cas.
1174,681 (D. Or. 1973).
211 The theory of why a franchisor might wish to employ a risk distribution
plan is discussed in the text accompanying notes 86-90 supra. One study has
reported that franchisors tend to offer financial aid when a large investment by
the franchisee is involved. See E. LEwis AND R. HmwcocK, supra note 42, at 33.
A tying arrangement is not the only way to collect revenue from the franchisees




cases, the tying arrangement should be prohibited because it creates
a potential barrier to entry into the franchisor's field without an
offsetting efficiency gain. The potential anticompetitive effect jus-
tifies holding the tie-in illegal even without a showing of actual
harm because of the need to limit the scope of the court's in-
quiry,212 problems of proof,213 and the general antitrust policy of
enhancing competition whenever it is not harmful to do so.
214
In other cases, however, a court will be confronted with a tie-in
that allows the franchisor to realize significant economies and thus
increase the scope of his operations. In such cases the court should
balance the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the tying
arrangement. Thus, an effort must be made in these cases to de-
termine whether the franchisor's control over production of the
tied product is in fact a significant deterrent to its potential com-
petitors. The relevant question here is whether the necessity of
entering both markets simultaneously is likely to result in higher
management or capital costs for a new entrant because of his lack
of skill or reputation in one of the fields. 215 Thus, the court should
consider the probability that a potential producer of the franchisor's
product would have the skills and reputation necessary to success-
fully produce the tied product as well.
If a court using this approach finds an actual entry barrier to
exist, the tie-in should be prohibited. Not only does the entry
barrier prevent new competition, but the insulation from competi-
tion is also likely to increase the level of the defendant's costs 216
and thus offset the procompetitive aspect of the tying arrangement
as well. In those cases in which the court doubts the existence of
an actual entry barrier, the tying arrangement should be permitted.
Either new competitors are free to enter the franchisor's product
market or, if they are not, it must be because of something other
than the tying arrangement.
Siegel v. Chicken Delight,217 a leading franchise-tying case,
would quite probably be decided differently under this test. The
212 See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1970)
(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
213 See note 200 supra.
2 14 See L. SuLr.mv, supra note 5, at 448.
215 See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
216 Costs may be increased either because managers released from competitive
pressures are less interested in managing the enterprise efficiently or because the
firm seeks to maintain its market power through increased e.xpenditures on,
inter alia, product differentiation, litigation, and political lobbying. See generally
F. Scrmmm, supra note 38, at 464-71.
217 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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tied products in Siegel, which included cookers, fryers, batter and
seasoning mixes, and packaging,218 were all items that a new fast
food operator could have obtained from other producers. The
tying arrangement thus did not create a barrier to entry into the
fast food industry. Assume, however, that somehow entry into the
fast food industry was inhibited by the tying arrangement. Little
information is presented in the opinion concerning the scope of
Chicken Delight's operations or the characteristics of its franchises.
The fact that no initial fee was charged to the franchisees 219 sug-
gests, however, that the tying arrangement was used in part to deal
with problems of risk and uncertainty. 220 On the other hand, the
opinion notes that other fast food franchisors similar to Chicken
Delight did not use tying arrangements.22' In view of this fact, the
tying arrangement would probably not be justified by transaction-
cost savings if it created a potential entry barrier problem.
B. Possible Objections to the Proposed Test
One possible objection to the proposed test is that most fran-
chise tie-ins will be permitted and, as a result, franchisees will be
defenseless against parent firms that seek to collect far more in
royalties than the franchisee expected to pay. Franchisees' fre-
quent dismay at the limits on their income is a major source of
conflict.222  Nevertheless, the antitrust laws, which threaten treble
damage liability and even criminal sanctions,223 are probably not
the best way to handle this problem. Antitrust violations should
be based on anticompetitive effects 22 4 rather than on uneasiness
with the behavior of franchisors. Of equal importance here is
the fact that the two parties share a common interest. In particular,
the franchisor depends on its franchisees to develop a market for its
218 Id. 46 n.1.
219 Id. 46.
220 Chicken Delight in effect leased its trademark for a variable rental which
depended on the amount of business received by the franchisee. This is precisely
the risk-reducing element of tying arrangements discussed in Burstein, supra note
1, at 71.
221448 F.2d at 48 n.4.
222 See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
223 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
224 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
("Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful.") (emphasis in original).
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products and maintain its accumulated consumer goodwill.22- Thus,
both parties have an incentive to adjust to each other's needs.
A second possible source of concern about the proposed test
is that it may permit intentionally predatory conduct if it is shown
to be justified by cost savings or if no anticompetitive effect results.
A partial response to this concern is that attempts to monopolize
are illegal under section 2 of the Sherman Act,226 and that tie-ins
have been used as evidence of an attempt to monopolize.227  By
removing the issue of the intent of a tie-in from the court's con-
sideration unless the plaintiff also alleges an attempt to monopolize,
the proposed test eases the burden of the rule-of-reason approach
on the courts. Additionally, few franchise tie-ins can be said to
have only one purpose; indeed, they often serve a variety of func-
tions.228  An intent-based inquiry would therefore probably be a
futile exercise.
One might also question whether a separate rule should be
created for franchise tying arrangements in view of the fact that
they have traditionally not been singled out for such special treat-
ment. A different approach for franchising is justified because
most of the plausible explanations for the use of franchise tie-ins 229
do not suggest serious anticompetitive effects. This cannot be said
of tie-ins in general. For example, tying arrangements of products
used in variable proportions may cause anticompetitive effects. 230




22 5 E. LEWIs AND R. HANcoc, supra note 42, at 6-9, 67. See also text
accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
22615 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). For a discussion of the attempt-to-monopolize
offense, see L. SuLr .arv, supra note 5, at 134-40; Handler & Steuer, Attempts
to Monopolize and No-Fault Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1980).
2 2 7 See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 720 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
228In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), for example, the franchisor claimed that the tying
arrangements were used for both quality control and revenue collection purposes.
Id. 50-51.
2 2
9 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
230 Baldwin & McFarland, supra note 1, at 769; Bowman, supra note 1, at
25-27.
2 3 1 Although courts have traditionally applied the per se ban on tying arrange-
ments to franchising without qualification, the Fourth Circuit referred recently to
the "emerging law of tie-ins in franchise settings." Phillips v. Crown Central
Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 627 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
The Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to hamper the establishment of
franchise systems by the use of per se rules. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977). Thus, some legal basis for a separate
rule for franchising already exists.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Courts confronted with economic justifications for tying ar-
rangements have tended to reject them, claiming that these argu-
ments are beyond judicial competence. Nevertheless, the costs of
such refusals are significant if the result is substantially less efficient
forms of enterprise organization.
This Comment has suggested that in the context of franchising
the cost of this refusal to consider the economic rationales of tying
arrangements is probably too great to ignore. The analysis has
also shown that the costs and benefits of such arrangements are
not difficult to understand. A more lenient approach to franchise
tying arrangements should therefore be adopted.
The major advantage of this Comment's proposal is that it
would allow society to reap many of the benefits of franchising
that are now being sacrificed in the name of the per se prohibition
of tying arrangements. A significant additional advantage of this
Comment's proposal is that it would not impose upon the courts an
administrative burden much, if at all, greater than under the
present so-called "per se" rule. A court would have to examine in
some detail the function of the tying arrangement in the operation
of the franchisor's business if the plaintiff can show a potential
entry barrier and the defendant attempts to show a procompetitive
effect. This, however, would not require much additional inquiry
beyond that currently required, because efficiency concerns 232 and
defenses 233 are already part of the law. Moreover, the type of evi-
dence that this Comment's proposal would require is not particularly
complex or obscure. Indeed, when the elimination of the coercion
requirement is considered, the overall cost of enforcement may be
no more under the proposed new rule than under the current rule.
232 See text accompanying notes 161-80 supra.
233 See text accompanying notes 174-80 supra.
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